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Full-Duplex Small-Cell Networks:
A Physical-Layer Security Perspective
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Abstract—We provide a theoretical study of physical (PHY)-
layer security performance in full-duplex (FD) small-cell net-
works. Here, the multi-antenna base stations (BSs) and user
equipments (UEs) follow from the homogeneous Poisson point
process (PPP)-based abstraction model. To facilitate FD com-
munications, we take into account (i) successive interference
cancellation (SIC) capability at the UE side via guard regions
of arbitrary radii, and (ii) residual self-interference (SI) at the
BS side using Rician fading distribution with arbitrary statis-
tics. We investigate the small-cell network PHY-layer security
performance in the presence of a Poisson field of eavesdroppers
(EDs), under the different scenarios of passive and colluding
eavesdropping. Considering linear zero-forcing (ZF) beamform-
ing, we characterize the downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) ergodic
secrecy rates and derive closed-form expressions for the different
useful and interference signals statistics. In certain special cases
of interest, we apply non-linear curve-fitting techniques to large
sets of (exact) theoretical data in order to obtain closed-form
approximations for the different ergodic rates and ergodic secrecy
rates under consideration. Our findings indicate that the FD
functionality, in addition to enhancing the spectral efficiency (SE),
can significantly improve the PHY-layer security performance,
especially with the aid of multi-antenna communications and
interference cancellation schemes.
Index Terms—Full-duplex small-cells, multi-antenna commu-
nications, ergodic secrecy rate, applied probability theory, non-
linear curve-fitting, system-level analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Legacy cellular networks have been designed and dimen-
sioned according to a complete separation of the transmit and
receive functionalities (what is known as half-duplex (HD)
operation). Specifically, the transceiving of wireless signals,
from the base station (BS) to the user equipment (UE) in the
downlink (DL), and from the UE to the BS in the uplink
(UL), are either separated orthogonally in time or frequency
domain; two prominent examples include time-division du-
plex (TDD) and frequency-division duplex (FDD) systems.
A major motivation behind this design and dimensioning
approach has been to bypass the extra interference which
arises from the bi-directional wireless functionality, namely,
residual self-interference (SI) at each FD transceiver, and
A. Babaei and A. H. Aghvami are with the Centre for Telecommunications Research
(CTR), Department of Informatics, King’s College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS,
United Kingdom. (e-mail: ayda.babaei@kcl.ac.uk; hamid.aghvami@kcl.ac.uk).
A. Shojaeifard and K-K. Wong are with the Communications and Information
Systems Group (CISG), Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University
College London, Torrington Place, London WC1E 7JE, United Kingdom. (e-mail:
a.shojaeifard@ucl.ac.uk; kai-kit.wong@ucl.ac.uk).
This work was supported by the United Kingdom Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council (EPSRC) under Grant no. EP/N008219/1.
Parts of this work were presented at the IEEE PIMRC 2017, Montreal, QC, Canada
[1] and the IEEE VTC-Spring 2018, Porto, Portugal [2].
mutual interference (MI) between the DL and the UL modes
of communications [3], [4].
Full-duplex (FD) operation, that is joint transmission and
reception of wireless signals at the same time and frequency,
has emerged as a disruptive technology for improving the
spectral efficiency (SE) performance in wireless systems [5],
[6]. Recently, there have been major advances in the family of
techniques used to combat SI directly in FD mode, including
any combination of analog, digital, and spatial domain can-
cellation [7]–[9]. In addition, the MI, a main limiting factor
in large-scale adoption of FD functionality, can be effectively
tackled through applying interference management techniques
such as successive interference cancellation (SIC) [10], [11].
With the aid of advanced techniques for tackling SI and MI,
it has been shown that significant FD versus HD SE gains can
be achieved in cellular networks [12]–[15]. The adoption of
FD functionality is considered particularly attractive for dense
small-cell BS deployment in the fifth generation (5G) cellular
networks and beyond [16].
Physical (PHY)-layer security is a de facto requirement for
the safeguarding of wireless systems [17]. It is quantified
by the difference in the useful and eavesdropping channel
capacities, what is known as secrecy rate [18]. This topic has
received a great deal of attention in recent years, including
the study of PHY-layer security in the context of relays
[19]–[21], cognitive radios [22], [23], heterogeneous networks
[24], wireless information and power transfer [25], and cloud
radio access networks [26]. Given that the locations of the
eavesdroppers (EDs) are in most cases not known to the
network, they can be modeled using stochastic processes.
There already exists a very rich literature on the design,
modeling, and analysis of large-scale wireless systems with
random ED locations, see, e.g., [27]–[30]. More recently,
the impact of randomly-located cooperating (a.k.a., colluding)
EDs has also been investigated in [31].
The emergence of FD operation provides a new paradigm
concerning all aspects of wireless system design, including
PHY-layer security performance. This topic has been investi-
gated in the recent literature (see, e.g., [32] and the references
therein for a survey). In [33], the authors proposed a new
solution for improving the PHY-layer security performance
using FD transceivers which perform joint reception and
jamming. The work in [33], as well as other related papers
such as [34]–[36], consider a deterministic single-cell setup. In
addition, the recent works in [37] and [38] study the PHY-layer
security performance in the context of FD-enabled wireless ad
hoc networks. To the best of our knowledge, the fundamental
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PHY-layer security performance in large-scale FD small-cell
networks is currently not well understood.
In this work, we aim to bridge the gap by devising a unified
theoretical framework for the study of ergodic secrecy rate
performance in FD small-cell networks where the locations of
the passive or colluding EDs are unknown. The main technical
contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• We study the PHY-layer security performance of large-
scale FD multi-user MIMO cellular networks under the
homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP)-based abstrac-
tion model of BSs, UEs, and EDs, with different scenarios
of passive and colluding eavesdropping.
• The residual SI channels are characterized using the
Rician distribution with arbitrary statistics which allows
for the capturing of the PHY-layer security performance
under different SI cancellation capabilities.
• We consider the generalized case where the UEs may
be capable of performing SIC through imposing guard
regions of arbitrary radii when modeling the UE-UE
interference.
• By leveraging on the tools from stochastic geometry
theory, we derive explicit expressions for the DL and UL
ergodic secrecy rates, with the statistics of the different
useful and interference signals given in closed-form.
• In certain special scenarios of interest, we utilize non-
linear curve-fitting techniques in order to provide closed-
form approximations for the different ergodic rates and
ergodic secrecy rates under consideration.
With the aid of the proposed analytical model, as well
as Monte-Carlo (MC) simulations, we draw network design
insights. Our findings illustrate that significant FD versus HD
PHY-layer security performance gains can be achieved, par-
ticularly through adopting advanced interference cancellation
schemes for tackling SI and MI. Conditioned on the system
experiencing secrecy non-outage, the relative FD versus HD
PHY-layer security performance gain (i) increases in the num-
ber of small-cell BS transmit/receive antennas, (ii) increases in
the EDs’ spatial deployment densities, and (iii) decreases in the
number of DL/UL UEs served per resource block. The results
also highlight that the underlying advantages of FD over HD
functionality in terms of ergodic secrecy rates can be greater
in the case of colluding versus passive eavesdropping, due to
the increased interference levels affecting the individual EDs’
SINRs in FD mode.
Organization: The remainder of this work is organized
as follows. The large-scale small-cell network model and
operation is described in Section II. The theoretical study of
the PHY-layer security performance is given in Section III.
Numerical examples are provided in Section IV, and finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Notation: X is a matrix; x is a vector; T , †, and +
are the transpose, Hermitian, and pseudo-inverse operations;
Ex[.] is the expectation; Pr[.] is the probability; Fx[.] is the
cumulative distribution function (CDF); Px[.] is the probability
density function (PDF); Lx[.] is the Laplace transform (LT)
function; |x| is the modulus; ‖x‖ is the Euclidean norm;
[x]
+
= max(x, 0) is the Ramp function; I(.) is the identity ma-
trix; CN (µ, ν2) is the circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian
distribution with mean µ and variance ν2; Γ(.) and Γ(., .) are
the Gamma and incomplete (upper) Gamma functions; G(κ, θ)
is the Gamma distribution with shape parameter κ and scale
parameter θ; and 2F1(., .; .; .) is the Gauss hypergeometric
function, respectively.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A. Network Topology
Consider a large-scale small-cell network where the FD
BSs and HD UL UEs are deployed based on homogeneous
PPPs φd and φu with spatial densities λd and λu, respectively.
Each FD small-cell BS, equipped with Nd transmit and Nu
receive antennas (Nd + Nu radio-frequency chains in total),
is considered to simultaneously serve Kd DL and Ku UL
HD single-antenna UEs per resource block. Note that the
assumption of HD UEs is made due to the inherent restrictions
of the legacy devices [39], otherwise, the framework can be
readily extended to the case of FD UEs [40]. The locations of
the EDs are generally not known to the network, therefore in
this work, they are modeled according to a homogeneous PPP
φe with spatial density λe [26], [27]. Moreover, we consider
the different scenarios where the (single-antenna) EDs are
operating independently and cooperatively [31]. Note that with
obvious adjustments, the HD system, where the DL and UL
occur over different resource blocks, can be described.
B. Cellular Association
By invoking the Slivnyak’s theorem [41], we perform the
DL analysis for a typical HD UE o considered to be located at
the center. Let l ∈ φd, k ∈ φu, and e ∈ φe denote the locations
of the BS l, UL UE k, and ED e, respectively. We consider the
cellular association strategy based on the maximum received
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) [42]. Here, this
is equivalent to cellular association based on the shortest
transmitter-receiver distances [43]. Mathematically, the tagged
BS of the reference DL UE o satisfies b = arg min(rl,o), l ∈
φd, where rl,o = ‖l− o‖ denotes the Euclidean distance. The
UL analysis, on the other hand, is carried out at the tagged
BS b with respect to the signal of an arbitrary HD UL UE i. It
should be noted that due to the cellular association procedure,
the scheduled UEs locations are inherently correlated [44].
Here, conditioning on the spatial constraints, we assume that
the set of scheduled UEs in the UL follows from a stationary
PPP [45], [46]. Further, we consider the most malicious EDs
in the DL and UL, respectively denoted with v and c, which
receive the strongest SINRs [19]. In the case of collusion,
we consider the cooperative EDs are capable of optimally
combining their eavesdropping signals [47], [48].
C. Fading Channel Model
Let pd and pu denote the (per-user) BS and UE transmit
powers, respectively. The DL channel gains from the BS l
at the UE k and ED e are gl,k ∈ C1·Nd and gl,e ∈ C1·Nd ,
respectively. Further, we denote the UL channel gains from
the UE k at the BS l and ED e using hk,l ∈ CNu·1 and
hk,e, respectively. The cross-mode channel gains from the
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BS l at the BS b, and from the UE k at the UE o are
represented using Hl,b ∈ CNu·Nd and gk,o, respectively. In
addition, the residual SI channel gain at the BS b is denoted
with Hb,b ∈ CNu·Nd . The residual SI channels are Rician
distributed with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
CN (µ, ν2) coefficients [49]. All other channels are considered
to be Rayleigh distributed with i.i.d. elements drawn from
CN (0, 1). In addition, we utilize the unbounded path-loss
model with exponent α > 2.
D. Beamfomring Design
In this work, we employ linear zero-forcing (ZF) beamform-
ing for suppressing intra-cell interference in both DL and UL
directions of communications [50]. Let Gl = [gTl,j ]
T
1≤j≤Kd ∈
CKd·Nd denote the collective DL channels from the BS l to its
Kd DL UEs. At the BS l, the linear ZF precoding matrix Vl =
[vl,j ]1≤j≤Kd ∈ CNd·Kd , E[‖vl,j‖2] = 1, is selected equal to
the normalized columns of G+l = G
†
l (GlG
†
l )
−1 ∈ CNd·Kd .
Moreover, let Hl = [hj,l]1≤j≤Ku ∈ CNu·Ku represent the
collective UL channels at the BS l from its Ku scheduled
UL UEs. At the BS l, the linear postcoding ZF matrix Wl =
[wTj,l]
T
1≤j≤Ku ∈ CKu·Nu , E[‖wj,l‖2] = 1, is selected equal to
the normalized rows of H+l = (H
†
lHl)
−1H†l ∈ CKu·Nu .
E. SINR Formulation
The received SINR (considering FD BSs) in the DL at the
UE o under linear ZF precoding is given by
γFDo =
Xo
Id,do + I
u,d
o + σ2o
(1)
where Xo = pd|gb,ovb,o|2r−αb,o is the intended re-
ceived signal power (from the serving BS), Id,do =∑
l∈φd\{b} pd‖gl,oVl‖2r−αl,o is the inter-cell interference (from
the transmitting BSs), Iu,do =
∑
k∈φu pu|hk,o|2r−αk,o is the
cross-mode interference (from the transmitting UEs), and σ2o
is the noise variance. The linear ZF precoding vector vb,o
is selected in the direction of the projection of gb,o on the
(Nd−Kd+1)-dimensional nullspace spanned by the multi-user
interference. Hence, the distribution of the intended channel
power gain is given by Gb,o = |gb,ovb,o|2 ∼ G(Nd−Kd+1, 1)
[51], [52]. With the assumption that the other BSs precoding
matrices have independent columns, the channel power gain
from each interfering BS is interpreted as the aggregation of
multiple separate beams from the projection of gl,o onto the
one-dimensional precoding vectors. Based on this assumption,
the inter-cell interference channel power gain distribution is
given by Gl,o = ‖gl,oVl‖2 ∼ G(Kd, 1). Moreover, the cross-
mode interference (from the single-antenna UEs) channel
power gain distribution is given by Hk,o = |hk,o|2 ∼ G(1, 1).
The received SINR (considering FD BSs) in the UL at the
BS b with respect to the signal from an arbitrary UL UE i
under linear ZF postcoding is given by
γFDi =
Xi
Iu,ui + I
d,u
i + I
i
i + σ
2
i
(2)
where Xi = pu|wTi,bhi,b|2r−αi,b is the intended re-
ceived signal power (from the reference UE), Iu,ui =∑
k∈φˆu pu|wTi,bhk,b|2r−αk,b , with φˆu denoting the set of outer-
cell scheduled UL UEs, is the inter-cell interference (from the
transmitting UEs), Id,ui =
∑
l∈φd\{b} pd‖wTi,bGl,bVl‖2r−αl,b
is the cross-mode interference (from the transmitting BSs),
Iii = pb‖wTi,bGb,bVb‖2 is the residual self-interference (from
the bi-directional operation), and σ2i is the noise variance.
Considering linear ZF postcoding, the intended channel power
gain distribution is given by Hi,b = |wTi,bhi,b|2 ∼ G(Nu −
Ku + 1, 1). Moreover, the inter-cell interference (from the
single-antenna UEs) channel power gain distribution is given
by Hk,b = |wTi,bhk,b|2 ∼ G(1, 1). By invoking the assumption
of independent (column-wise) outer-cell precoding matrices,
the cross-mode interference (from transmitting BSs) channel
power gain distribution is given by Gl,b = ‖wTi,bGl,bVl‖2 ∼
G(Kd, 1). Furthermore, the residual SI channel power gain
over the multi-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
Rician fading channel can be approximated as Gb,b =
‖wTi,bGb,bVb‖2 ∼ G(κ, θ) where (3) and (4) [49], as shown at
the bottom of this page.
The received SINR (considering FD BSs) in the DL at the
most malicious passive and colluding ED v are respectively
given by
γFDv = max
e∈φe
(
Xe
Id,de + I
u,d
e + σ2e
)
(5)
and
γFDv =
∑
e∈φe
(
Xe
Id,de + I
u,d
e + σ2e
)
(6)
where Xe = pd‖gb,evb,e‖2r−αb,e is the intended received
signal (from the serving BS), Id,de =
∑
l∈φd pd‖gl,eVl‖2r−αl,e
is the inter-cell interference (from the transmitting BSs),
Iu,de =
∑
k∈φu pu |hk,e|2r−αk,e is the cross-mode interference
(from the transmitting UEs), and σ2e is the noise variance.
The channel power gain distributions are given by Gb,e =
‖gb,evb,e‖2 ∼ G(1, 1), Gl,e = ‖gl,eVl‖2 ∼ G(Kd, 1), and
κ ,
Kd(Nu + 1) (Nd −Kd + 2)
(
µ2 + ν2
)2(
2NuNd +
Kd(Nd−Kd+2)
Nu+1
(NuNd −Nu −Nd − 1)
)
µ4 + (Nu + 1)(Nd + 1)ν2 (2µ2 + ν2)
(3)
θ ,
(
2NuNd +
Kd(Nd−Kd+2)
(Nd+1)
(NuNd −Nu −Nd − 1)
)
µ4 + (Nu + 1)(Nd + 1)ν
2
(
2µ2 + ν2
)
(Nu + 1) (Nd −Kd + 2) (µ2 + ν2) (4)
0090-6778 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCOMM.2018.2811495, IEEE
Transactions on Communications
CFDo =
4piλd
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
Nd−Kd∑
n=0
{
(−s)n
n!
dn
dsn
exp
(−sσ2o)LId,do [s]LIu,do [s]}
s= γr
α
pd
 dγr exp (−piλdr2) dr (9)
CHDo =
2piλd
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
Nd−Kd∑
n=0
{
(−s)n
n!
dn
dsn
exp
(−sσ2o)LId,do [s]}
s= γr
α
pd
 dγr exp (−piλdr2) dr (10)
LId,do [s] = exp
(
−piλdr2
(
2F1
(
Kd,− 2
α
; 1− 2
α
;−spd
rα
)
− 1
))
(11)
LIu,do [s] = exp
(
−piKuλdε2
(
2F1
(
1,− 2
α
; 1− 2
α
;−spu
εα
)
− 1
))
(12)
Hk,e = |hk,e|2 ∼ G(1, 1).
The received SINR (considering FD BSs) in the UL at the
most malicious passive and colluding ED c are respectively
given by
γFDc = max
e∈φe
(
Xe
Iu,ue + I
d,u
e + σ2e
)
(7)
and
γFDc =
∑
e∈φe
(
Xe
Iu,ue + I
d,u
e + σ2e
)
(8)
where Xe = pu|ho,e|2r−αo,e is the intended received sig-
nal (from the reference UE), Iu,ue =
∑
k∈φu pu|hk,e|2r−αk,e
is the inter-cell interference (from the transmitting UEs),
Id,ue =
∑
l∈φd pd ‖gl,eVl‖2r−αl,e is the cross-mode inter-
ference (from the transmitting BSs), and σ2e is the noise
variance. The channel power gain distributions are given by
Ho,e = |ho,e|2 ∼ G(1, 1), Hk,e = |hk,e|2 ∼ G(1, 1), and
Gl,e = ‖gl,eVl‖2 ∼ G(Kd, 1).
Note that the EDs’ SINR expressions in this work corre-
spond to the case where the EDs have no information regarding
the codebook of UEs and BSs. However, the analysis can be
modified to capture other scenarios (e.g., by removing certain
interference terms from the EDs’ SINRs) [53].
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the PHY-layer security performance
in FD small-cell networks under both scenarios of passive
and colluding eavesdropping. Note that the ergodic rates (in
b/s/Hz) of the reference DL and UL UEs, o and i, over
two resource blocks, are given by CFDo = 2E[log2(1 + γFDo )]
and CFDi = 2E[log2(1 + γFDi )] in FD mode, and CHDo =
E[log2(1 + γHDo )] and CHDi = E[log2(1 + γHDi )] in HD mode,
respectively. Similarly, the ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the
most malicious DL and UL EDs, v and c, over two resource
blocks, are given by CFDv = 2E[log2(1 + γFDv )] and CFDc =
2E[log2(1 + γFDc )] in FD mode, and CHDv = E[log2(1 + γHDv )]
and CHDc = E[log2(1 + γHDc )] in HD mode, respectively.
Remark 1. By invoking the Jensen’s inequality,
E[max(X,Y )} ≥ max{E{X},E{Y }], the bounded DL
and UL ergodic secrecy rates (considering FD BSs)
are respectively given by SFDo = [C
FD
o − CFDv ]+ and
SFDi = [C
FD
i −CFDc ]+. Similarly, in the case of HD operation,
the bounded DL and UL ergodic secrecy rates are respectively
given by SHDo = [C
HD
o − CHDv ]+ and SHDi = [CHDi − CHDc ]+.
A. User Equipments
We proceed by deriving explicit expressions for the DL and
UL UEs ergodic rates under linear ZF beamforming. Note
that the DL MI is characterized considering the UEs may be
capable of performing SIC. In order to capture performance
for general cases, we consider an exclusion region of radius ε
when modeling the UE-UE interference [54].
Theorem 1. The DL ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the useful
UE o in the FD and HD small-cell networks over two resource
blocks are given by (9) and (10) where (11) and (12), as shown
at the top of this page.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 2. The guard region radius ε in the MI expression
in (12) can be set by design or through measurements based
on the SIC capability at the UE side. In particular, ε = 0
corresponds to the worst-case without SIC capability.
Theorem 2. The UL ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the useful
UE i in the FD and HD small-cell networks over two resource
blocks are given by (13) and (14) where (15), (16), and (17),
as shown at the top of the next page.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 3. The Rician fading distribution parameters µ and
ν in the residual SI expression in (17) can be tuned by design
or measurements to capture the SI cancellation capability at the
BS side. For example, ν = 0 and µ = 0 correspond to perfect
SI removal and non line-of-sight (NLOS) SI, respectively.
Remark 4. The derivatives of the interfering terms LT
functions required for the calculation of the ergodic rates in
the Theorems 1-2, which arise as a result of multi-antenna
communications, can be readily computed through applying
the Faa` di Bruno’s formula [55].
B. Passive Eavesdroppers
Next, we derive explicit expressions for the ergodic rates
of the most malicious passive EDs in the DL and UL. Note
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CFDi =
4piλd
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
Nu−Ku∑
n=0
{
(−s)n
n!
dn
dsn
exp
(−sσ2i )LIu,ui [s]LId,ui [s]LIii [s]
}
s= γr
α
pu
)
dγr exp
(−piλdr2) dr
(13)
CHDi =
2piλd
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
Nu−Ku∑
n=0
{
(−s)n
n!
dn
dsn
exp
(−sσ2i )LIu,ui [s]}
s= γr
α
pu
)
dγr exp
(−piλdr2) dr (14)
LIu,ui [s] = exp
(
−piKuλdr2
(
2F1
(
1,− 2
α
; 1− 2
α
;−spu
rα
)
− 1
))
(15)
LId,ui
[s] = exp
(
−piλd (spd)
2
α
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
Kd +
2
α
)
Γ(Kd)
)
(16)
LIii [s] = (1 + spdθ)
−κ (17)
that in this case the EDs act independently (do not exchange
information).
Theorem 3. The DL ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the most
malicious passive ED v in the FD and HD small-cell networks
over two resource blocks are given by (18) and (19) where (20)
and (21), as shown at the bottom of this page.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 4. The UL ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the most
malicious passive ED c in the FD and HD small-cell networks
over two resource blocks are given by (22) and (23) where (24)
and (25), as shown at the bottom of this page.
Proof: See Appendix D.
C. Colluding Eavesdroppers
The ergodic rates of the most malicious colluding EDs in
the DL and UL are derived next. The cooperating EDs in
this case form a distributed antenna system [47], [48]. Note
CFDv =
2
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
1− exp
(
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
[
exp
(−sσ2v)LId,dv [s]LIu,dv [s]]s= γrαpd r dr
))
dγ (18)
CHDv =
1
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
1− exp
(
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
[
exp
(−sσ2v)LId,dv [s]]s= γrαpd r dr
))
dγ (19)
LId,dv [s] = exp
(
−piλd (spd)
2
α
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
Kd +
2
α
)
Γ(Kd)
)
(20)
LIu,dv [s] = exp
(
−piKuλd (spu)
2
α Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
))
(21)
CFDc =
2
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
1− exp
(
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
{
exp
(−sσ2c)LIu,uc [s]LId,uc [s]}s= γrαpu r dr
))
dγ (22)
CHDc =
1
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γ
(
1− exp
(
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
{
exp
(−sσ2c)LIu,uc [s]}s= γrαpu r dr
))
dγ (23)
LIu,uc [s] = exp
(
−piKuλd (spu)
2
α Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
))
(24)
LId,uc [s] = exp
(
−piλd (spd)
2
α
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
Kd +
2
α
)
Γ(Kd)
)
(25)
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CFDv ≤
4piλepd
ln(2)γ(1 + γ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r0
r1−α
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−sσ2v)LId,dv [s]LIu,dv [s] ds dr dγ (26)
CHDv ≤
2piλepd
ln(2)γ(1 + γ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r0
r1−α
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−sσ2v)LId,dv [s] ds dr dγ (27)
CFDc ≤
4piλepu
ln(2)γ(1 + γ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r0
r1−α
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−sσ2c)LIu,uc [s]LId,uc [s] ds dr dγ (28)
CHDc ≤
2piλepu
ln(2)γ(1 + γ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r0
r1−α
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−sσ2c)LIu,uc [s] ds dr dγ (29)
that most previous studies of randomly-located colluding EDs
such as [31] are carried out for single-cell HD systems, where
the EDs do not experience any interference. In the case of
multi-cell FD systems with randomly-located colluding EDs,
the analysis becomes significantly more challenging as one
needs to account for the impact of MI in both the DL and the
UL.
Theorem 5. The bounded DL ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the
most malicious colluding ED v in the FD and HD small-cell
networks over two resource blocks are given by (26) and (27),
as shown at the top of this page.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Theorem 6. The bounded UL ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the
most malicious colluding ED c in the FD and HD small-cell
networks over two resource blocks are given by (28) and (29),
as shown at the top of this page.
Proof: The proof follows from a similar approach to that in
Appendix E.
Remark 5. The parameter r0 in the colluding EDs ergodic
rate expressions from Theorems 5-6 represents the guard
region distance required to satisfy the secrecy non-outage
condition.
The expressions developed in Theorems 1-6 can be readily
used to obtain the different SEs required in the calculation
of the PHY-layer security performance via two-fold integral
computations. This is in line with the state-of-the-art results on
stochastic geometry-based SE analysis of large-scale wireless
networks in the literature [53]. Although there is no well-
known method to simplify these SE expressions further, the
proposed theoretical framework provides significant advan-
tages in terms of computational complexity versus the Monte-
Carlo simulations.
D. Special Cases
As previously highlighted, the SE expressions do not admit
closed-forms. In what follows, we apply non-linear curve-
fitting techniques to large sets of (exact) theoretical data in
order to obtain some explicit closed-form approximations for
the different ergodic rates and ergodic secrecy rates under
consideration. We accordingly provide goodness of fit mea-
surements in terms of R-Squared (R2) and estimated variance
(Var).
The following results are obtained for the special case
where each multi-antenna small-cell BS serves a single UE
per resource block in each DL/UL direction. This assumption
is made for the sake of simplifying the non-linear curve-fitting
operation. However, it should be noted that the single-user
MIMO transmission technology is widely employed for FD
small-cell BS deployment in the literature [15].
Corollary 1. Consider the special case with Nd = Nu = N ,
Kd = Ku = 1, pd = pu, α = 4, σ2d = σ
2
u = 0. The DL
ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the useful UE o in the FD (with
different SIC capabilities) and HD small-cell networks over
two resource blocks are approximated by
CFDo ≈ 2.78 log (1 + 1.55N) ,
(w/ SIC, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 2.00× 10−3) (30)
CFDo ≈ 2.33 log (1 + 1.3N) ,
(w/o SIC, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 6.41× 10−3) (31)
CHDo ≈ 1.43 log (1 + 3.4N) ,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 2.65× 10−4). (32)
Remark 6. The results from Corollary 1 indicate that a
significant gain in the FD DL ergodic rate can be achieved
through reducing the MI level using SIC.
Corollary 2. Consider the special case with Nd = Nu = N ,
Kd = Ku = 1, pd = pu, α = 4, σ2d = σ
2
u = 0. The UL
ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the useful UE i in the FD (with
different residual SI) and HD small-cell networks over two
resource blocks are approximated by
CFDi ≈ 2.33 log (1 + 1.3N) ,
(w/o SI, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 6.41× 10−3) (33)
CFDi ≈ 2.31 log (1 + 1.3N) ,
(w/ NLOS SI, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 6.59× 10−3) (34)
CHDi ≈ 1.43 log (1 + 3.4N) ,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 2.65× 10−4). (35)
Remark 7. We observe based on the results from Corollary
2 that the FD UL ergodic rate performance is largely limited
by the MI as there is only a small difference in performance
between the different perfect SI cancellation and NLOS SI
cases.
Corollary 3. Consider the special case with Nd = Nu = N ,
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Kd = Ku = 1, pd = pu, α = 4, σ2d = σ
2
u = 0. The DL
ergodic rates (in b/s/Hz) of the most malicious passive ED v
and UL ergodic rates (in b/s/HZ) of the most malicious passive
ED c in the FD and HD small-cell networks over two resource
blocks are approximated by
CFDv = C
FD
c ≈ 5 log (1 + 0.55λe) ,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙, variance ≈ 5.31× 10−5) (36)
CHDv = C
HD
c ≈ 3 log (1 + 0.9λe) ,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙, variance ≈ 2.85× 10−5). (37)
Remark 8. The results from Corollary 3 indicate that in the
case of passive EDs, the ergodic rate of the most malicious
ED increases only logarithmically in the EDs’ spatial density.
Corollary 4. Consider the special case with Kd = Ku = 1,
pd = pu, α = 4, σ2d = σ
2
u = 0. The DL ergodic rates (in
b/s/Hz) of the most malicious colluding ED v and the UL
ergodic rates (in b/s/HZ) of the most malicious colluding ED
c in the FD and HD small-cell networks over two resource
blocks are approximated by
CFDv = C
FD
c ≈ 42
λe
r20
,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙, variance ≈ 7.40× 10−4) (38)
CHDv = C
HD
c ≈ 84
λe
r20
,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙, variance ≈ 2.70× 10−4). (39)
Remark 9. We observe based on the results from Corollary
4. that in the case of colluding EDs, the ergodic rate of the
most malicious colluding ED increases linearly in the EDs’
spatial density.
Note that the logarithmic versus linear behavior of the most
malicious ED ergodic rate in the EDs’ spatial density under
passive (Remark 8) and colluding (Remark 9) eavesdropping
can be attributed to their corresponding SINR formulation (i.e.,
max(.) versus
∑
(.) functions).
Corollary 5. Consider the special case with Nd = Nu =
N , Kd = Ku = 1, pd = pu, α = 4, σ2d = σ
2
u = 0. The
DL ergodic secrecy rate (in b/s/Hz) of the useful UE o with
respect to the most malicious passive ED v in the FD (with
different SIC capabilities) and HD small-cell networks over
two resource blocks are approximated by
SFDo = [2.55 log (1 + 2N)− 2.1λe]+ ,
(w/ SIC, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 1.40× 10−2) (40)
SFDo = [2 log (1 + 2N)− 2.1λe]+ ,
(w/o SIC, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 1.47× 10−2) (41)
SHDo = [1.4 log (1 + 3.6N)− 2.1λe]+ ,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 1.16× 10−2). (42)
Corollary 6. Consider the special case with Nd = Nu = N ,
Kd = Ku = 1, pd = pu, α = 4, σ2d = σ
2
u = 0. The UL
ergodic secrecy rate (in b/s/Hz) of the useful UE i with respect
to the most malicious passive ED c in the FD (with different
residual SI) and HD small-cell networks over two resource
blocks are approximated by
SFDi = [2 log (1 + 2N)− 2.1λe]+ ,
(w/o SI, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 1.34× 10−2) (43)
SFDi = [1.94 log (1 + 2.2N)− 2.1λe]+ ,
(w/ NLOS SI, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 1.47× 10−2) (44)
SHDi = [1.4 log (1 + 3.6N)− 2.1λe]+ ,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 1.16× 10−2). (45)
Corollary 7. Consider the special case with Nd = Nu =
N , Kd = Ku = 1, pd = pu, α = 4, σ2d = σ
2
u = 0. The
DL ergodic secrecy rate (in b/s/Hz) of the useful UE o with
respect to the most malicious colluding ED v in the FD (with
different SIC capabilities) and HD small-cell networks over
two resource blocks are approximated by
SFDo =
[
2.5 log (1 + 2.2N)− 42λe
r20
]+
,
(w/ SIC, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 6.40× 10−2) (46)
SFDo =
[
1.9 log (1 + 2.5N)− 42λe
r20
]+
,
(w/o SIC, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 6.41× 10−2) (47)
SHDo =
[
1.4 log(1 + 3.6N)− 84λe
r20
]+
,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 8.25× 10−2). (48)
Corollary 8. Consider the special case with Nd = Nu = N ,
Kd = Ku = 1, pd = pu, α = 4, σ2d = σ
2
u = 0. The UL
ergodic secrecy rate (in b/s/Hz) of the useful UE i with respect
to the most malicious colluding ED c in the FD (with different
residual SI) and HD small-cell networks over two resource
blocks are approximated by
SFDi =
[
1.9 log (1 + 2.5N)− 42λe
r20
]+
,
(w/o SI, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 6.41× 10−2) (49)
SFDi =
[
1.9 log (1 + 2.45N)− 42λe
r20
]+
,
(w/ NLOS SI, R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 6.44× 10−2) (50)
SHDi =
[
1.4 log(1 + 3.6N)− 84λe
r20
]+
,
(R2 ≈ 0.9˙,Var ≈ 8.25× 10−2). (51)
Remark 10. The results from Corollaries 5-8 indicate that
the DL and UL FD (w/o SI and w/ NLOS SI) over HD ergodic
secrecy rate gains under both passive and colluding eaves-
dropping are always greater or equal to one (with N ≥ 1 and
λe ≥ 0) - in other words, the FD operation always achieves an
improved or equivalent PHY-layer security performance versus
the HD counterpart. Whilst the system experiences secrecy
non-outage, increasing the number of small-cell BS antennas
(N → +∞) always enhances the DL and UL FD over HD
ergodic secrecy rate gains. Further, the corresponding impact
of the EDs’ spatial density can be described as follows. As
λe → 0 (no eavesdropping), the DL and UL FD over HD
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Fig. 1. Impact of the number of BS transmit/receive antennas on the small-cell network PHY-layer security performance in the presence of a Poisson field
of passive EDs. System parameters are: λd = 4pi km
−2, λu = Kuλd km−2, λe =
λd
10
km−2, Kd = Ku = 1, pd = 23 dBm, pu = 20 dBm, W = 10
MHz, σ2o = σ
2
v = σ
2
i = σ
2
c = −170 dBm/Hz, α = 4.
ergodic secrecy rate gains tend to the DL and UL FD over HD
ergodic rate gains. Increasing λe from zero to λ∗e continuously
enhances the DL and UL FD over HD ergodic secrecy rate
gains, where λ∗e represents the critical point where the system
experiences secrecy outage. In the limit λe → +∞, such that
λe ≥ λ∗e , the DL and UL FD over HD ergodic secrecy rate
gains tend to one. Note that the value of λ∗e depends on the
interference cancellation capabilities as well as the number of
small-cell BS transmit/receive antennas.
In order to demonstrate the validity of the approximate
expressions derived within Corollaries 1-8 versus the (exact)
theoretical data, we provide some numerical examples in
Appendix F.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide several numerical examples in
order to assess the PHY-layer security performance of FD and
HD small-cell networks in the presence of a Poisson field
of EDs. The spatial density of the small-cell BSs is set to
be λ(d) = 4pi per km
2. The (per-user) BS and UE transmit
powers are kept fixed at pd = 23 dBm and pu = 20 dBm,
respectively. The noise spectral density at all receivers is
−170 dBm/Hz and the total system bandwidth is W = 10
MHz. The MC simulations are obtained from 20 k trials
in a circular region of radius 10 km. Note that all results
correspond to the per-user ergodic secrecy performance over
two resource blocks. In the FD small-cell network, the DL
and UL run simultaneously, whereas in the HD small-cell
network, the DL and UL occur over different resource blocks.
Furthermore, in the FD system, we take into account different
interference cancellation schemes. In particular, in the DL, we
consider the cases with and without SIC capability at the UE
side. Moreover, in the UL, we capture the performance under
different perfect SI cancellation and NLOS residual SI with a
variance of −55 dB [3].
A. Impact of the Number of Base Station Antennas
1) Passive Eavesdroppers: We study the impact of the
number of small-cell BS transmit and receive antennas on
the small-cell network DL and UL PHY-layer security per-
formance under a Poisson field of passive EDs in Fig. 1. It
can be observed that in all cases, the ergodic secrecy rate
always increases in the number of antennas. This is due to the
improved array gain from multi-antenna communications, and
hence, stronger useful signal power, whilst the interference
level remains the same. Furthermore, the FD over HD small-
cell network PHY-layer security performance gain always
increases in the number of antennas. In point of fact, even
with SIC capability and perfect SI suppression, only negligible
FD versus HD improvements in ergodic secrecy performance
can be achieved when the small-cell BSs are equipped with
a few antennas. This trend highlights the essential role of
MIMO in harnessing the full potential of FD technology
through enhancing the system robustness against the increased
interference level versus that in the HD operation [56], [57].
The presence of significant residual SI (e.g., variance > −30
dB), would typically result in secrecy outage (even when the
number of antennas is relatively large). The current SI can-
cellation capabilities can achieve orders of magnitude greater
cancellation (e.g., in the range 60 − 100 dB [9]), hence, the
FD operation is certainly feasible. It is important to note that
in such cases the impact of residual SI becomes negligible
compared to the MI [15], [40]. It may be useful to note that to
achieve higher FD versus HD PHY-layer security performance
gains in the UL, the transmit power of the small-cell BSs
should be reduced. It can be observed that the MC simulations
confirm the validity of our findings in Theorems 1-4.
2) Colluding Eavesdroppers: Next, the impact of the num-
ber of small-cell BS transmit and receive antennas on the
small-cell network DL and UL PHY-layer security perfor-
mance under a Poisson field of colluding EDs is depicted
in Fig. 2. Similar to the case of passive EDs, increasing the
number of antennas always results in higher ergodic secrecy
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Fig. 2. Impact of the number of BS transmit/receive antennas on the small-cell network PHY-layer security performance under a Poisson field of colluding
EDs. System parameters are: λd = 4pi km
−2, λu = Kuλd km−2, λe =
λd
200
km−2, r0 = 12 km, Kd = Ku = 1, pd = 23 dBm, pu = 20 dBm, W = 10
MHz, σ2o = σ
2
v = σ
2
i = σ
2
c = −170 dBm/Hz, α = 4.
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Fig. 3. Impact of the number of UEs on the small-cell network PHY-layer security performance in the presence of a Poisson field of passive EDs.
System parameters are: λd = 4pi km
−2, λu = Kuλd km−2, λe =
λd
5
km−2, Nd = Nu = 10, pd = 23 dBm, pu = 20 dBm, W = 10 MHz,
σ2o = σ
2
v = σ
2
i = σ
2
c = −170 dBm/Hz, α = 4.
rates, as well as greater FD versus HD PHY-layer security
performance gains. Furthermore, our findings indicate that
the relative FD versus HD ergodic secrecy rate gain can be
considerably higher in the case of colluding EDs. The reason
is because each cooperative ED experiences added interference
(i.e., MI) in the case of FD operation which in turn degrades
the colluding EDs’ combined SINR. It is important to note
that the case of collusion represents the absolute worst-case
scenario in terms of PHY-layer security performance. As a
result, unless the EDs’ spatial density is set to very small
values (relative to the BS deployment density), the small-cell
network experiences secrecy outage with high probability. It
should be noted that the MC results from Fig. 2 confirm the
validity of our findings in Theorems 1-2 and Theorems 5-6.
B. Impact of the Number of Users
1) Passive Eavesdropping: We investigate the impact of the
number of users served per resource block on the small-cell
network DL and UL PHY-layer security performances under a
Poisson field of passive EDs in Fig. 3. The results indicate that
the per-user ergodic secrecy rate performance in all systems
always decreases in the number of UEs served per cell. On
the other hand, it should be noted that the corresponding
ergodic area secrecy rate (e.g., λdKdSo (b/s/Hz/km2), in the
DL) increases with higher number of users served per resource
block. The reason is that with greater Kd and Kd, respectively,
the DL and UL array gains are decreased due to the linear ZF
beamforming. In addition, increasing Kd and Ku results in
higher MI in the UL and DL, respectively. As a result, it can
be inferred that the FD versus HD small-cell network PHY-
layer security performance gain decreases as we increase the
number of DL and UL UEs served per cell. Intuitively, if we
keep Ku fixed, increasing Kd results in higher FD versus HD
DL ergodic area secrecy rate (and vice versa). In addition, it
should be noted that the importance of effective interference
cancellation is heightened in the case of FD small-cell BSs
0090-6778 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCOMM.2018.2811495, IEEE
Transactions on Communications
1 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
# of DL UEs per Cell
D
L
E
rg
od
ic
Se
cr
ec
y
R
at
e
[b
/s
/H
z]
FD (w/ SIC)
FD (w/o SIC)
HD
MC
1 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
# of UL UEs per Cell
U
L
E
rg
od
ic
Se
cr
ec
y
R
at
e
[b
/s
/H
z]
FD (w/o SI)
FD (NLOS SI)
HD
MC
Fig. 4. Impact of the number of UEs on the small-cell network PHY-layer security performance in the presence of a Poisson field of colluding EDs. System
parameters are: λd = 4pi km
−2, λu = Kuλd km−2, λe =
λd
400
km−2, r0 = 12 km, Nd = Nu = 10, pd = 23 dBm, pu = 20 dBm, W = 10 MHz,
σ2o = σ
2
v = σ
2
i = σ
2
c = −170 dBm/Hz, α = 4.
serving more UEs, such to avoid secrecy outage scenarios.
2) Colluding Eavesdropping: In Fig. 4, we study the effect
of the number of users served per resource block on the small-
cell network DL and UL PHY-layer security performances
under a Poisson field of colluding EDs. The trends previously
highlighted in the case of passive PPP-based EDs also apply
here. In particular, increasing the number of UEs served per
cell deceases the per-user ergodic secrecy rate and increases
the area ergodic secrecy rate, respectively. Also, in the case of
large-scale ED collusion, the FD over HD small-cell network
PHY-layer security performance gain decreases if we simulta-
neously increase the number of DL and UL UEs served per
cell. On the other hand, for a given number of UL UEs in a
cell, increasing the number of DL UEs served per resource
block results in higher relative FD versus HD DL ergodic
secrecy rate (and vice versa).
C. Impact of the Eavesdroppers’ Density
1) Passive Eavesdroppers: Next, we proceed by investigat-
ing the impact of the EDs’ spatial density on the small-cell
network DL and UL PHY-layer security performances under
a PPP-based abstraction model of passive EDs in Fig. 5. As
expected, it can be observed that the ergodic secrecy rate
decreases in all cases in the ratio of ED over BS deployment
densities. Moreover, increasing the spatial density of the EDs
enhances the FD versus HD small-cell network PHY-layer
security performance gain. This is because while the stronger
ED channel capacity degrades the ergodic secrecy rate values,
the respective rate of decrease in the PHY-layer security
performance is higher in HD versus FD small-cell networks
as a result of the extra interference experienced by the EDs in
the latter system. As previously highlighted, the relative FD
versus HD UL ergodic secrecy gain can be increased through
reducing the transmit power of the small-cell BSs.
2) Colluding Eavesdroppers: Finally, the effect of EDs’
spatial density on the small-cell network PHY-layer security
performance in the presence of a Poisson field of colluding
EDs is depicted in Fig. 6. We can observe similar trends to
those highlighted in the case of passive EDs. In particular,
the PHY-layer security performance benefits in all cases from
smaller ED PPP-based deployment density. Moreover, the
underlying FD versus HD gains in terms of ergodic secrecy
rate increases with larger values of λe up to the point in which
the system experiences secrecy outage. In addition, as pre-
viously highlighted, the UL PHY-layer security performance
in the FD small-cell network is particularly susceptible to
interference. Hence, enabling multi-antenna communications
and interference cancellation capabilities is essential towards
avoiding secrecy outage scenarios in the UL.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We provided a stochastic geometry-based framework for
the study of PHY-layer security performance in multi-cell FD
small-cell networks. The locations of the BSs, equipped with
multiple antennas, and UEs were captured using the PPP-
based abstraction model. The small-cell network was consid-
ered to be overlaid with a Poisson field of EDs, with both
scenarios of independent as well as cooperative eavesdropping
under consideration. By leveraging on the tools from applied
probability theory, we derived explicit expressions for the
ergodic secrecy rates with closed-form LT functions for the
useful and interference signals statistics. Non-linear curve-
fitting techniques were further utilized to devise closed-form
approximations in certain special cases of interest. With the
aid of the proposed analytical model, and MC simulations, we
drew network design insights concerning the ergodic secrecy
rate performance. In particular, the findings highlighted that
significant improvements in PHY-layer security performance
can be attained by enabling FD functionality at the BS side,
particularly, in conjunction with multi-antenna communica-
tions and interference cancellation schemes.
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APPENDIX A
The ergodic rate (considering FD BSs) for the user o in the
DL per resource block can be calculated using
CFDo = E
[
log2
(
1 + γFDo
)]
=
1
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1− F FDγo|rb,o=r[γ]
1 + γ
dγ Prb,o [r] dr
(A.1)
where
FγFDo |rb,o=r[γ] = Pr
[
γFDo < γ | rb,o = r
]
= 1− Pr
[
Gb,o >
γrα
pd
(
Id,do + I
u,d
o + σ
2
o
)] (i)
= 1−
Nd−Kd∑
n=0
{
(−s)n
n!
dn
dsn
exp
(−sσ2o)LId,do [s]LIu,do [s]}
s= γr
α
pd
(A.2)
with (i) written using the identity xnf(x) ≡
(−1)n dndsnLf(x)[s] (a property of LT function). Hence,
we arrive at (9).
The LT function of the inter-cell interference at the reference
UE in the DL o is given by
LId,do (s) = Eφd,Gl,o
exp
−s ∑
l∈φd\{b}
pdGl,or
−α
l,o

(i)
= Eφd
 ∏
l∈φd\{b}
EGl,o
[
exp
(
−spdGl,or−αl,o
)]
(ii)
= exp
(
−2piλd
∫ ∞
r
(
1− 1
(1 + spdx−α)
Kd
)
x dx
)
(iii)
= exp
(
−piλdr2
(
2F1
(
Kd,− 2
α
; 1− 2
α
;−spd
rα
)
− 1
))
(A.3)
0090-6778 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCOMM.2018.2811495, IEEE
Transactions on Communications
where (i) follows independence property of PPP and
uncorrelated channel conditions [58], (ii) is obtained by
applying the probability generating functional (PGFL)
of a PPP and converting from Cartesian to polar
coordinates [59], and (iii) is written by applying the
integral identity
∫ +∞
r
(
1− (1 + βx−α)−K
)
x dx =
r2
2
(
2F1
(
− 2α ,K; 1− 2α ;− βrα
)
− 1
)
.
Using a similar approach to that in the above, the LT
function of the MI at the reference UE in the DL o is given
by
LIu,do (s) = Eφu,Gk,o
exp
−s ∑
k∈φu
puGk,or
−α
k,o

= exp
(
−2piKuλd
∫ ∞
ε
(
1− 1
1 + spux−α
)
x dx
)
= exp
(
−piKuλdε2
(
2F1
(
1,− 2
α
; 1− 2
α
;−spu
εα
)
− 1
))
(A.4)
where  can be tuned by design or measurements to capture
the SIC capability of the UEs. Hence, we arrive at Theorem
1. 
APPENDIX B
Utilizing a similar approach to that in Appendix A, we
can arrive at (13). Moreover, using a similar methodology,
the LT functions of the different UL interfering terms for the
postcoding of the useful signal at the reference BS are given
by
LIu,ui (s) = Eφu,Hk,i
exp
−s ∑
k∈φˆu
puHk,ir
−α
k,i

= exp
(
−2piKuλd
∫ ∞
r
(
1− 1
1 + spux−α
)
x dx
)
= exp
(
−piKuλdr2
(
2F1
(
1,− 2
α
; 1− 2
α
;−spu
rα
)
− 1
))
(B.1)
LId,ui
(s) = Eφd,Hl,i
exp
−s∑
l∈φd
pdHl,ir
−α
l,i

= exp
(
−2piλd
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1
(1 + spdx−α)
Kd
)
x dx
)
= exp
(
−piλd (spd)
2
α
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
Kd +
2
α
)
Γ(Kd)
)
(B.2)
and
LIb,bi
(s) = (1 + spdθ)
−κ
. (B.3)
Hence, we arrive at Theorem 2. 
APPENDIX C
The ergodic rate (considering FD BSs) of the most ma-
licious passive ED in the DL v per resource block can be
calculated using
CFDv = E
[
log2
(
1 + γFDv
)]
=
1
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1− F FDγv [γ]
1 + γ
dγ
(C.1)
where
FγFDv [γ] = Pr[γ
FD
v < γ] = Pr
[
max
e∈φe
(
pdGb,er
−α
b,e
Id,de + I
u,d
e + σ2e
)
< γ
]
= Eφe
∏
e∈φe
Pr
(
pdGb,er
−α
b,e
Id,de + I
u,d
e + σ2e
< γ | φe
) (i)=
exp
(
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
(
1− Pr
[
pdGb,vr
−α
Id,dv + I
u,d
v + σ2v
< γ
])
r dr
)
(C.2)
with (i) obtained using the PGFL of a PPP and converting
from Cartesian to polar coordinates. The probability from the
above is given by
1− Pr
[
pdGb,vr
−α
Id,dv + I
u,d
v + σ2v
< γ
]
= Pr
[
Gb,v >
γrα
pd
(
Id,dv + I
u,d
v + σ
2
v
)]
=
{
exp
(−sσ2v)LId,dv (s)LIu,dv (s)}s= γrαpd . (C.3)
Hence, we arrive at (18).
The LT function of the inter-cell interference at the most
malicious ED in the DL v is given by
LId,dv (s) = Eφd,Gl,v
exp
−s∑
l∈φd
pdGl,vr
−α
l,v

(i)
= Eφd
∏
l∈φd
EGl,v
[
exp
(
−spdGl,vr−αl,v
)]
(ii)
= exp
(
−2piλd
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1
(1 + spdx−α)
Kd
)
x dx
)
(iii)
= exp
(
−piλd (spd)
2
α
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
Kd +
2
α
)
Γ(Kd)
)
(C.4)
where (i) follows from the independence property of PPP
and uncorrelated channel conditions, (ii) is obtained using
the PGFL of a PPP and converting from Cartesian to polar
coordinates, and (iii) is written using the integral identity∫ +∞
0
(
1− (1 + βx−α)−K
)
x dx =
β
2
α Γ(1− 2α )Γ(K+ 2α )
2Γ(K) .
Using a similar approach to that in the above, the LT
function of the MI at the most malicious ED in the DL v
is given by
LIu,dv (s) = Eφu,Gk,v
exp
−s ∑
k∈φu
puGk,vr
−α
k,v

= exp
(
−2piKuλd
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1
1 + spux−α
)
x dx
)
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= exp
(
−piKuλd (spu)
2
α Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
))
. (C.5)
Hence, we arrive at Theorem 3. 
APPENDIX D
Utilizing a similar approach to that in Appendix C, we can
arrive at (22). Moreover, using a similar methodology, the LT
functions of the different UL interfering terms at the most
malicious ED c are given by
LIu,uc (s) = Eφu,Hk,c
exp
−s ∑
k∈φu
puHk,cr
−α
k,c

= exp
(
−2piKuλd
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1
1 + spux−α
)
x dx
)
= exp
(
−piKuλd (spu)
2
α Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
))
(D.1)
and
LId,uc (s) = Eφd,Hl,c
exp
−s∑
l∈φd
pdHl,cr
−α
l,c

= exp
(
−2piλd
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1
(1 + spdx−α)
Kd
)
x dx
)
= exp
(
−piλd (spd)
2
α
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
Kd +
2
α
)
Γ(Kd)
)
. (D.2)
Hence, we arrive at Theorem 4. 
APPENDIX E
The ergodic rate (considering FD BSs) of the most mali-
cious colluding ED in the DL v per resource block can be
calculated using
CFDv = E
[
log2
(
1 + γFDv
)]
=
1
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
1− F FDγv [γ]
1 + γ
dγ
(E.1)
where
1− FγFDv [γ] = Pr[γFDv > γ]
= Pr
∑
e∈φe
(
pdGb,er
−α
b,e
Id,de + I
u,d
e + σ2e
)
> γ

(i)
≤ 1
γ
E
∑
e∈φe
(
pdGb,er
−α
b,e
Id,de + I
u,d
e + σ2e
)
(ii)
=
2piλe
γ
∫ ∞
r0
E
[
pdGb,er
−α
Id,de + I
u,d
e + σ2e
]
r dr
(iii)
=
2piλe
γ
∫ ∞
r0
E
[
pdGb,vr
−α] ∫ ∞
0
exp
(−sσ2v)
×LId,de [s]LIu,dv [s] ds r dr
(iv)
=
2piλepd
γ
∫ ∞
r0
r1−α
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−sσ2v)
×LId,de [s]LIu,dv [s] ds dr (E.2)
with (i) is written using the Markov inequality, (ii) follows
from applying the Campbell’s theorem to a sum over PPP
and converting from Cartesian to polar coordinates [59], (iii)
is obtained using the approach from [60] for calculating the
moments of SINR, and (iv) is given by taking the average
over the ED useful signal. Hence, we arrive at Theorem 5. 
APPENDIX F
Here, we provide some numerical examples in order to
demonstrate the validity of the approximate expressions de-
veloped in Corollaries 1-8 for some special cases of interest.
In Fig. F.1, we present the ergodic rate performance of the
intended DL and UL UEs versus different number of small-
cell BS antennas for the special case described in Corollaries
1-2.
Next, we depict the ergodic rate performance of the most
malicious DL and UL EDs versus different EDs’ spatial
densities in Fig. F.2. The results are obtained considering
passive EDs as in Corollary 3, and colluding EDs as in
Corollary 4, respectively.
The DL and UL ergodic secrecy rates in the FD and HD
small-cell networks in the presence of a Poisson field of
passive EDs under the system parameters described in Corol-
laries 5-6 are depicted in Fig. F.3. Finally, the corresponding
PHY-layer security performance in the presence of PPP-based
colluding EDs for the special case described in Corollaries
7-8 is shown in Fig. F.4.
The numerical examples provided in this Appendix confirm
the validity of the approximate expressions in Corollaries 1-8.

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